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For Michael Walzer, arguing about war is political rather than philosophical, a matter 
of persuasion rather than proof. His discussion of humanitarian intervention since the 
publication of Just and Unjust Wars tracks political events and debates, including the 
transformation of a debate focused on the right to intervene into one about situations, 
like those in Rwanda or Libya, in which it might be wrong not to intervene. If there is a 
duty to thwart atrocities, based on a responsibility to protect, one must consider on 
whom the duty to intervene falls, whether it goes beyond rescue to repairing the harm 
or preventing further violence, and whether it might also extend to protecting people 
from other harms, at least when these are the result of violence. In discussing these 
issues, Walzer deepens our understanding of humanitarian intervention by treating it 
both as an aspect of just war theory and as a historic practice able to reconcile the 
rights of states and persons in the changing circumstances of political choice.  
 
Michael Walzer likes to say that for him just war theorizing is not an academic exercise 
– a philosophical effort to find coherence in a set of ideas and to state that coherence 
systematically, dispassionately, and in abstraction from policies and decisions. Others 
may treat just war as a topic in philosophy, but he sees his own contribution to the 
discussion as practical, not philosophical, a contribution to politics, not political theory. 
This stance creates tensions in his work that academic critics sometimes pounce upon as 
evidence of philosophical incoherence. But that incoherence is inherent in political 
debate because political arguments are persuasive rather than demonstrative. The 
resulting discourse is a matter of many voices advancing sometimes incommensurable 
considerations that can be reduced to univocal certainty only by tyranny – and tyranny 
is the denial of politics. We expect proofs in geometry and sometimes in philosophy but 
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not in politics. The occasional inconsistencies in Walzer’s arguments reflect their 
political character and his resistance to turning political questions into philosophical 
ones.  
It is not surprising, then, that Walzer’s discussion of humanitarian intervention 
tracks political events and debates, from India’s 1971 invasion of East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) – the case he relies upon in Just and Unjust Wars – to the bombing of 
Serbia by NATO in 1991 in the war over Kosovo, the post 9/11 invasion of Iraq, and 
the 2011 intervention in Libya. His discussion also engages the failure of anyone to 
intervene militarily in Rwanda in 1994 or in the Darfur region of Sudan since 2003 
(though the UN Security Council did authorize sanctions against Sudan and the 
International Criminal Court indicted its president, Omar al Bashir, and several others). 
These cases, especially Rwanda, have moved the debate from the circumstances in 
which a state or group of states – the UN, a regional alliance such as NATO, or the 
league or concert of democracies that some American liberals have recently joined 
neoconservatives in advocating – has a right to intervene to whether there are situations 
in which it would be wrong not to intervene.  
Can there be a duty to intervene? Walzer addresses this question in his prefaces 
to the third and fourth editions of Just and Unjust Wars as well as in several essays 
written long after the publication of the first edition, including ‘The Politics of Rescue’ 
(1995), ‘The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention’ (2002), and ‘Beyond 
Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights in a Global Society’ (2004). And he 
considers some further questions to which this one leads: if there is a duty to intervene, 
whose duty is it? Is it limited to rescuing the victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and 
similar wrongs, or must the rescuers ensure that the killing does not resume when they 
depart? If there is such a duty, does this not imply that such wrongs should be 
prevented, not merely repaired? And if there is a duty to protect people from becoming 
victims of atrocity, might there also be a duty to protect them from other harms, such as 
natural disasters, famine, or endemic poverty, at least when these are the direct or even 
indirect result of injustice? Where should we draw the line between humanitarian 
intervention and humanitarian assistance, and on what grounds? I will discuss these 
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questions, starting with those Walzer treats in Just and Unjust Wars, and assess how 
well his conclusions hold up in the light of subsequent events and criticism.1  
 
1 Grounds for Intervention  
The discussion of humanitarian intervention in Just and Unjust Wars is a landmark. It 
reclaimed the expression from obscurity and made the topic inescapable in arguments 
about war. Walzer defines humanitarian intervention as a response to massive human 
rights violations, and he distinguishes it from other kinds of intervention: intervention to 
protect one’s own nationals, intervention in a civil war to preserve a balance of local 
forces against intervention by another state (‘counter-intervention’), and intervention to 
assist a national community to gain independence from a state whose government the 
secessionists regard as alien and oppressive. Like most of those who have attempted to 
define the grounds and limits of humanitarian intervention, he presumes the validity of 
the non-intervention rule and defends intervention on humanitarian grounds as justified 
only as a response to shocking crimes for which there is no other remedy, not as a way 
of freeing people from the oppression of alien domination or ordinary home-grown 
tyranny. Following J.S. Mill, he argues that the non-intervention rule holds in cases of 
national liberation unless the community is already engaged in a sustained military 
struggle.2 By successfully exercising authority in a territory and defending that exercise 
by force, the secessionist community demonstrates its de facto independence.  
These exceptions to the non-intervention rule indicate that its rationale, morally 
speaking, is to protect the state as the legal embodiment of a people or nation. That 
rationale explains why there is an exception for humanitarian intervention, for a 
government that commits great crimes against its own people or some portion of them 
cannot be said to represent them. Its misconduct undermines its claim to sovereignty. In 
such cases, there is no requirement that those to be protected by an intervention must 
struggle to resist their oppressor: victims of massacre do not have to pass the test of 
self-help to qualify for assistance.3 But there is a presumption in favour of sovereignty: 
intervention must be justified as ‘an exception to the general rule, made necessary by 
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the urgency or extremity of a particular case’.4 An intervening state bears the burden of 
showing that the case is indeed exceptional and that the victims cannot be protected in 
any other way.  
This argument does not contradict the claim that force is justified as a defence 
against aggression; it simply extends the principle grounding that claim to a different 
kind of situation. We acknowledge that one state may help another to resist aggression. 
In the case of humanitarian intervention, the intervening state is assisting not another 
state but the subjects of a state whose own government is the ‘aggressor’, which makes 
these subjects the victim of aggression. In such a situation, an intervention is no less 
justifiable than self-defence, which in the context of international relations is simply a 
state protecting itself against aggression rather than protecting someone else. The appeal 
to sovereignty has weight, but only up to a point. If the victims of aggression are under 
the jurisdiction of another state, the sovereign rights of that state are reduced, for no 
state can have the right to violate the rights of the people it is supposed to protect. It is, 
in other words, not the ‘self’ in ‘self-defence’ that provides the just cause, but rather the 
defence of human rights.  
The argument for humanitarian intervention illuminates the ultimate ground for 
using force more clearly than does self-defence, which from the perspective of morality 
is a special case within a larger class of justifications. It also answers the question 
whether an aggressor state – one that forcibly violates the rights of other states or even 
its own people, thereby inviting a military response – can plead self-defence to justify 
continued fighting if its aggression is resisted. Clearly it cannot, unless that resistance 
itself turns into a war of aggression. An assailant cannot plead self-defence to justify 
further blows against a victim who tries to fight back. But neither can the victim, having 
thwarted the assault, proceed to kill or enslave the subdued assailant. This is the kind of 
reasoning that Walzer deals with, in Just and Unjust Wars, when he argues that a just 
war in Korea – which was a response to the North’s effort forcibly to unify the entire 
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country – became an unjust war to overthrow the North Korean regime.5 It is also the 
kind of reasoning the United States rejected in the Persian Gulf War when it chose not 
to take advantage of its victory over Iraqi forces in Kuwait to occupy Baghdad and 
depose Saddam Hussein. Walzer’s general point, that ‘just wars are limited wars’,6 
holds for humanitarian interventions as well as other kinds of military action.  
 
2 Objections 
There are many objections to this understanding of humanitarian intervention, and 
Walzer responds at one point or another to most of them. One objection, considered in 
Just and Unjust Wars, is that few interventions are undertaken for humanitarian reasons. 
He answers that in every case known to him ‘the humanitarian motive is one among 
several’ but that ‘it is not necessarily an argument against humanitarian intervention that 
it is, at best, partially humanitarian’.7 This seems right to me, though I would question 
the implication that humanitarianism is a matter of motives: one might argue that an 
intervention that ends a massive atrocity is morally justified and for that reason qualifies 
as ‘humanitarian’, whatever the motives of those who decide to intervene. If the end to 
which the actions of a government, or some of them, are directed is to stop the killing, 
its motives for doing so – or, perhaps we should say, the motives of the officials who 
decided to intervene – are of secondary importance in judging the justice of the 
intervention. The action is humanitarian in intent and, if successful, in result, even if 
self-interest provides the motive that makes it happen.  
If this reasoning is sound, it suggests the vacuity of the argument that only states 
that respect human rights at home can rightly intervene to protect human rights abroad. 
Acting to thwart a slaughter is the right thing to do even for governments and officials 
whose motives are not entirely pure and whose hands are not entirely clean. Leaving 
aside hypothetical cases in which monstrous tyrants get to have their interventions 
justified by such reasoning, the point might have application in a case like Vietnam’s 
intervention to oust the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia – Vietnam not being notable for 
respecting human rights. The real reason for invoking the ‘clean hands’ criterion is a 
concern with politics, not morality. If one opposes an intervention, pointing out the 
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moral defects of those who intervene might be rhetorically effective. Any stick will do 
to beat a dog.  
Walzer considers other objections in subsequent writings. One of the most 
common, and tiresome, of these objections is that interventions are selective. How can a 
state claim the right to intervene in one situation and then refuse to intervene in another? 
Is it not guilty of hypocrisy? It is surprising how often this argument appears, usually in 
a highly politicized context in which the critics want not only to dispute an intervention 
but also to repudiate those who support it. To take but one recent example, the historic 
decision of the Arab League to endorse an intervention in Libya on humanitarian 
grounds, and then of the UN Security Council to authorize it and of the US and other 
governments to carry it out, have been attacked by commentators as disingenuously 
selective. Andrew Sullivan wonders how President Obama can say that the US cannot 
stand idly in Libya when it does nothing in Burma and the Congo.8 Noting that every 
year millions die from hunger or malaria, another commentator asks ‘Why this?’.9 A 
justification can be demanded for any intervention, but as an objection the rhetorical 
question is pointless because the decision to intervene in a particular case depends on 
prudential considerations as well as moral ones. And this is Walzer’s view. There were, 
he suggests, compelling moral reasons to intervene in Tibet, Chechnya, and East Timor, 
but the risks would have been daunting and the chances of success small.10 A state does 
not have to intervene in every case in which to intervene would be morally justifiable. It 
can consider the costs and benefits of intervening.11 But whether a decision to intervene 
or refrain from intervening is right or wrong, it does not affect the moral status of the 
non-intervention rule. That a rule has been selectively applied may cause us to question 
a particular decision, but it does not invalidate the rule itself. It makes little sense to 
argue that because a state has failed to rescue the victims of violence in one situation it 
should refrain from doing so in another. Walzer rightly detects the political premise of 
the selectivity objection, which is that humanitarian intervention is a mask for 
aggression, and its political aim, which is to undermine the case for intervention in a 
                                                
8 Sullivan, The Atlantic, 18 Mar. 2011, available at: 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2011/03/the-imperial-president.html. 
9 Klein, ‘What do we know about our commitment to Libya’, Washington Post, 18 Mar. 2011, available 
at:  www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/what-do-we-know-about-our-commitment-to-
libya/2011/03/18/AB0mNHr_blog.html. 
10 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (3rd edn), supra note 1, at p.xiii. 
11 Walzer, Thinking Politically, supra note 1, at 250. 
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particular situation or by a particular state (usually the United States), even when 
intervention is morally justifiable, by arguing against humanitarian intervention in 
general.  
A more plausible objection is that humanitarian intervention infringes the rights 
of citizens of the intervening state. When a state resorts to military force, it exposes its 
soldiers to injury and death and spends money that has been raised by taxing its citizens. 
If a state exists to protect its citizens, incurring such costs to protect those who are not 
citizens violates the rights of soldiers and citizens by compelling them to risk their lives 
or give up income for the benefit of foreigners. Walzer provides a prudential response to 
this objection when he observes that states have an interest in suppressing uncivilized 
behaviour abroad because that behaviour can have undesirable consequences at home as 
violence spreads, refugees flee, and tyrants are emboldened. He does not spend much 
time discussing the issue of individual rights, however, saying on one occasion only that 
the question whether volunteers or conscripts should bear the risks of fighting as part of 
an interventionary or peacekeeping force is a complicated one,12 and on another that 
humanitarian interventions should be carried out by volunteers because, although states 
may have a duty to intervene, individuals cannot can be obligated, except by a choice of 
their own, to risk their lives in such a mission.13  
I am not persuaded by this argument. The question is politically complicated, 
but morally speaking the answer seems reasonably clear. It is already implicit in 
Walzer’s own argument against appeasement, which is that it betrays the obligation of 
every state to resist aggression, if it can, wherever it occurs.14 States do not exist only to 
serve the interests and protect the rights of their citizens; they have responsibilities that 
extend to the interests and rights of non-citizens as well. If force is justified not only in 
self-defence but more generally to defend the innocent, and if defending the innocent is 
sometimes a duty, a state can justifiably incur the costs of performing that duty and 
citizens will have to share those costs. It should try to limit the costs, within the bounds 
of what is needed to get the job done,15 but force cannot be used without expense and 
without the risk of death. Choosing to intervene under rules that require peacekeepers to 
watch killers murder their victims, which is what happened in Bosnia, or by dropping 
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 8 
bombs, as in Kosovo, shifts the costs of war from the intervening forces to people on 
the ground. It should not matter that the victims a government is being called upon to 
protect belong to a community other than its own: Walzer agrees that it cannot just sit 
and watch.16 But if a government has a duty to act, how can it do that effectively 
without using the human and other resources at its command? It may be true that ‘there 
are no “lower orders,” no invisible, expendable citizens in democratic states today’,17 
but it is not clear how this amounts to an argument that a state can compel military 
service only in wars of self-defence. One could argue that we should never compel 
human beings to be used as resources, especially in ways that pose the risk of death, but 
that objection is aimed broadside at the state as a non-voluntary association, not at 
humanitarian intervention specifically.  
The objection that has been advanced most vigorously, however, is that if a state 
can intervene to end massive human rights violations, it should intervene to end lesser 
ones. There is no good reason, the argument goes, to limit humanitarian intervention to 
situations of mass atrocity. There is a continuum of abuses from systematic genocide 
and ethnic cleansing down through the murders, rapes, and mutilations perpetrated by 
tyrants and warlords to the ugly reality of routine oppression in the armies, police 
forces, prisons, and slums of every country. The most obvious reply to this slippery 
slope objection is a pragmatic one: intervention is a costly and not necessarily effective 
way to protect human rights, an option that should be considered only if there is no 
good alternative to using military force. But there is also a morally grounded reply: a 
rule that permitted military intervention as a remedy for routine abuses would deny 
political communities the right to manage their own affairs. This is in fact Walzer’s 
judgement. It reflects his view of international society as a regime of toleration in which 
internal and external legitimacy are distinguished. To intervene in situations in which 
the abuses do not ‘shock the conscience of mankind’18 would be improperly to infringe 
the independence to which states are morally entitled, within wide limits. It may be hard 
to draw a line between great and little crimes, but not that hard: we are not looking at a 
continuum here, Walzer insists, but at ‘a chasm, with nastiness on one side and 
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17 Walzer, Thinking Politically, supra note 1, a 244–245. 
18 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 1, at 107; Walzer, Arguing about War, supra note 1, at 69. 
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genocide on the other’.19 
 
3 Beneficence or Justice? 
It follows, at least on the traditional understanding of humanitarian intervention that 
Walzer is defending, that its aims are always limited. They are limited to rescuing the 
victims of massive violence and do not extend to ameliorating other wrongs, certainly 
not ordinary human rights violations. Nor are interventions justified for the sake of 
democracy or other values or institutions some might like to see in other countries. But, 
he thinks now, the story of humanitarian intervention told in Just and Unjust Wars is 
too simple. According to that story, the purpose of intervening is to rescue the victims 
of atrocity: to end the killing – and, if necessary, remove the tyrant who ordered it – and 
then get out, letting politics in the target country return to normal. But this assumes that 
the cause of the atrocity is ‘external and singular’, the work of a tyrant or invader, rather 
than internal, a matter of deeply rooted attitudes or institutions (as seems to have been 
the case in Rwanda and Sudan) or of failed institutions and open war among gangs of 
warlords (as in Bosnia and Somalia). Situations like these do not fit the 
victim/victimizer model assumed by the traditional view of humanitarian intervention.20 
Such situations require not only a rescue but longer-term involvement as well: military 
occupation, trusteeship arrangements, nation building, and other measures designed to 
ensure that self-determination is possible after the killing stops. Such policies are 
expensive, put soldiers at risk, and require continuing political support at home. The 
government of a nation that has been attacked will not find it difficult to mobilize 
people in its defence, but the initial charitable impulse to rescue distant victims of 
aggression may be hard to maintain, especially when it means supporting an operation 
that had forestalled a larger massacre, in which case ‘no one would know what hadn’t 
happened’.21  
Most of what Walzer has to say about humanitarian intervention after Just and 
Unjust Wars deals with questions of this sort, political questions. One of the hazards of 
                                                
19 Walzer, Thinking Politically, supra note 1, at 238. 
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to removing a tyrant because the attacks on Gaddafi’s forces probably did prevent a massacre. The 
success of this campaign left NATO in search of a rationale for continuing its military activities in Libya. 
That military action by the US and others might have forestalled a larger catastrophe – the threshold 
required for the intervention to be called ‘humanitarian’ – is, however, an unprovable counterfactual.  
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moral thinking is to think that every question is a moral question or that moral inquiry 
can prescribe particular actions or policies. Moral reflection can tell us that when a 
government is massacring its own people, someone should try to stop the violence. But 
it cannot tell us when that threshold has been reached, or who should try, or what we 
should adopt as ‘plan B’ when those who should try do not. ‘The decision to intervene, 
whether it is local or global, whether it is made individually or collectively, is always a 
political decision.’22 It must be heartening to Walzer, whose approach has been at odds 
with the moralism of political theory in the past few decades, that the kind of realism he 
has consistently urged – a realism based not on realpolitik but on an understanding of 
the interpretative and argumentative character of political deliberation and its collective 
character – has once again come into fashion. It remains to be seen whether this new 
realism, which is based on criticism of a politically and philosophically naïve ‘applied 
ethics’, can avoid slipping into the ethically questionable political realism signalled by 
expressions like realpolitik and raison d’état.23 In Walzer’s case, it does not, as his 
1973 essay ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ and his argument that the 
laws of war should be overridden in a genuine supreme emergency make evident.24 
The genocide in Rwanda, which no state intervened to prevent, raised this 
tension between the moral and the political in a dramatic way. Here, the world did just 
sit and watch. The problem, Walzer joins others in observing, is that even when it is 
obvious that somebody ought to intervene, it is not clear who that somebody is. The 
responsibility to act is what philosophers call an ‘imperfect duty’, a duty that is assigned 
to no specific agent.25 Many solutions have been proposed to the so-called agency 
problem, the problem of finding ‘a better, more reliable, form of agency’.26 Perhaps, 
Walzer suggests, the duty falls most clearly on the country that can intervene quickly 
and effectively. Often this will be a neighbouring state such as India in East Pakistan, 
                                                
22 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (3rd edn), supra note 1, at pp.xiii–xiv. 
23 Recent critics of applied ethics include Bernard Williams, who contrasts political realism with political 
moralism, and Raymond Geuss, who rejects what he calls an ‘ethics-first’ approach to political argument. 
I criticize their arguments along with Walzer’s in Nardin, ‘Middle-Ground Ethics: Can One be Politically 
Realistic Without Being a Political Realist?’, 25 Ethics & International Affairs (2011) 1.  
24 Walzer, Thinking Politically, supra note 1, at 278–295; Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 1, at 251–
263. 
25 On the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and its implications for humanitarian 
intervention see my discussion in the ‘Introduction’ to T. Nardin and M.S. Williams (eds), Humanitarian 
Intervention, Nomos XLVII (2006), at 14–18. 
26Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (3rd edn), supra note 1, at p.xiii. 
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Tanzania in Uganda, or Vietnam in Cambodia.27 Alternatively, an imperfect duty can be 
turned into a perfect one by being assigned to someone. In the case of a general duty to 
protect, the puzzle is to determine who has the responsibility or the authority to assign 
it. If we think the duty to protect lies with the international community collectively, it 
would imply a duty to agree on a representative to conduct or authorize interventions on 
behalf of the community. Perhaps the UN is that representative. But although a UN 
authorized intervention might be more likely than a unilateral intervention to be seen as 
legitimate and to gain wide support, it would not necessarily be more just or more 
effective. This is not an argument against efforts to create a regime to discharge what 
has come to be called ‘the responsibility to protect’. It is simply to acknowledge that 
there is no escaping the question whether, when the designated agent fails to act, other 
states ‘could act legitimately in its place’.28  
The agency problem is just one of many questions that can be identified if one 
grants that there is a duty or responsibility to protect. There is also a question whether 
humanitarian intervention should be viewed as an exercise in beneficence (assisting the 
victims) or justice (resisting the perpetrators). On an old view of the matter, there is a 
duty to intervene in the affairs of others not only to protect the victims of violence but 
also to enforce the rules that prohibit it. The Muslim principle of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong, for example, prescribes that it is the duty of one Muslim to intervene 
when another is acting wrongly, in an expanding circle that starts with one’s neighbours 
and ends with the world.29 A similar principle is found in Christian just war theory from 
Augustine to Grotius, according to which force may be used to prevent and punish 
violations of natural law, wherever they may occur. We are more likely today to speak 
of human rights than of natural law. The duty to intervene when human rights are 
violated is a duty not only to assist the victims of violence but also to rectify the wrong 
by resisting the violation and bring the violator to justice. It is an expression of justice 
as well as of beneficence.  
If the duty to protect is a duty of justice, the claim that humanitarian intervention 
must be limited to rescue will need to be amended. Rescuing the victims of a massacre 
                                                
27 Walzer, Thinking Politically, supra note 1, at 240. 
28 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (3rd edn), supra note 1, at p.xiv. 
29 M. Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam (2003), at p.xi. Forbidding wrong ‘is not a duty to help people in 
trouble, but rather to stop people doing wrong’ (at 165). The principle is broad but includes coercive 
intervention (action ‘with the hand’ in contrast to verbal admonition) in some circumstances.  
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may leave the killers free to continue or resume their killing. Rescue is only one of 
many measures required to protect people from being murdered. If conditions are such 
that crimes against humanity can occur, it is not enough to put out the flames; one must 
ensure that they will not immediately flare up again. And crimes must be punished or – 
if one chooses the path of forgiveness and reconciliation – at least acknowledged.  
The Libyan case is relevant here. For some, it is manifestly right for NATO to 
go beyond ‘rescue’ to ensure that those who protested and then rebelled against Gaddafi 
will not be murdered if his regime survives the rebellion and ensuing intervention. But 
this is not Walzer’s view, or at least was not his view at the time the intervention began. 
Writing in The New Republic, he opposed the intervention on many grounds, starting 
with the obscurity of its ends and ending with the absence of genuine support from 
other Arab states, notably Egypt, which shares a border with Libya and has the military 
capacity to intervene effectively. But the main reason is that the military action against 
Gaddafi’s forces is not, in Walzer’s view, properly seen as a humanitarian intervention 
to stop a massacre. ‘There would have been a cruel repression after a Qaddafi victory … 
but the overthrow of tyrants and the establishment of democracy has to be local work, 
and in this case, sadly, the locals couldn’t do it.’30 Nor, presumably, can the intervention 
be justified in terms borrowed from J.S. Mill as justified support for a war of national 
liberation since arguably there is no foreign yoke to be thrown off, just the well-worn 
yoke of the local tyrant. ‘The problem with a secessionist movement is that one cannot 
be sure that it in fact represents a distinct community until it has rallied its own people 
and made some headway in the “arduous struggle” for freedom.’31 Libya’s tribalism 
points to its unrealized character as a nation, but not to the sort of foreign domination 
that for Mill, and Walzer, would justify an intervention. Like every other judgement, 
this one will be contested, but the relevance of the ‘foreign yoke’ criterion is evident, it 
seems to me, in the eagerness with which the media seized upon reports that Gaddafi 
was employing ‘foreign mercenaries’, for the presence of foreign forces on Gaddafi’s 
side would make it easier to defend the intervention as a justified liberation effort or 
even a counter-intervention (assuming, against the evidence, that the scale of foreign 
involvement was significant). 
                                                
30 Walzer, ‘The Case Against Our Attack on Libya’, The New Republic, 20 Mar. 2011, available at: 
www.tnr.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya. 
31 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 1, at 93. 
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The Libyan intervention is also relevant to the question of how to define success 
in an intervention to protect the victims of violence and bring the violators to justice. At 
what point should those who are intervening withdraw their forces? And what must be 
done, after that, to ensure that the duty to protect is discharged? In Just and Unjust 
Wars, Walzer criticizes the United States, following its intervention in Cuba in 1898, 
for refusing to recognize the insurgent provisional government and occupying the 
country instead, and he suggests that India’s invasion of East Pakistan provides a ‘better 
example’ of humanitarian intervention because it imposed no political controls on the 
new state of Bangladesh. The argument implies that India, as the intervening power, did 
not have a moral duty to repair the damage in Bangladesh after it had defeated the 
Pakistani army and brought the massacre to an end. Perhaps this is because Bangladesh, 
with a strong and unified people, was able to repair itself without foreign supervision. 
But this underlines the importance of having a functioning government through which 
self-determination can be exercised. When a country cannot govern itself because it is 
riven by ethnic passions or its affairs are in the hands of armed criminals, the duty to 
protect might mean governing until the conditions for self-determination have been 
established. Such considerations help us to understand why the discussion of Libya has 
moved so quickly from protection to getting rid of Gaddafi, for (as one observer put it), 
‘it is hard to see how the intervention could save the Libyan people from Gadhafi’s 
wrath – he has openly stated his murderous intentions – without getting rid of him’.32 
 
4 Arguments for Regime Change 
Such reasoning brings us to the venerable ideas of trusteeship (where the intervening 
power governs) and protectorate (where it merely defends the local government, which 
it has helped to establish, against internal or external threats). That such arrangements 
were common in the age of European empire is no argument against reviving them, if 
the intervention is legitimate and they provide a solution to post-intervention problems. 
Many objections are advanced against the institution of trusteeship, just as there 
are many objections to humanitarian intervention. (I will focus on trusteeship as more 
intrusive and therefore presumably more objectionable than a protectorate.) Some call 
attention to the tension between trusteeship and self-determination. It is argued, for 
                                                
32 Slater, ‘An Uneasy Defense of the Libyan Intervention’, Buffalo Evening News, 3 Apr. 2011, available 
at: www.buffalonews.com/editorial-page/viewpoints/article383383.ece.  
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example, that the idea of trusteeship denies self-determination by requiring stability as a 
precondition for the exercise of sovereignty and fostering dependence on the trustee.33 
One purpose of trusteeship, to establish a non-violent order, contradicts another, to 
encourage domestic ownership. But order is a precondition of ownership, which is the 
exercise of independence and rights: there must be an ordered ‘self’ before there can be 
‘determination’. It is argued that trusteeship denies self-determination because the 
trustee is accountable to the international organization that empowered it rather than to 
the local people.34 That may be true, legally speaking, but if the trustee were legally 
accountable to the people it would be their own government, not a trustee. The trustee 
still has moral duties to those whose affairs it administers, regardless of the laws that 
empower it. It is argued that a trustee might favour one faction or another or reinforce 
the inequalities between the factions that generated the humanitarian crisis in the first 
place. Yes, this might happen, but if one of those sides were genocidal, it would be both 
prudent and morally justifiable to reduce its power in the new regime. It is argued that 
there will be tensions if the laws the trustee imposes clash with local practices and 
preferences.35 In East Timor, for example, the UN mission that governed the country 
between 1999 and 2002 stirred resentment by applying Indonesian law after it had 
ended the violence instigated by the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias. 
True, but the question of how to balance the laws and customs of different groups in an 
ethnically divided country is inescapable and a matter for political resolution. An 
internationally appointed trustee might find it difficult to respect traditional practices 
that did not conform to Western ideas of human rights and justice.36 If humanitarian 
intervention is to be defined and regulated within a global regime of law and rights, the 
basic principles of that regime will have to be observed even if they originated in 
Western practices.  
From the perspective of the trustee, democratization and market liberalization 
might appear to be the key to stability.37 But such policies favour factions that can 
organize themselves effectively, including ethnic factions that had been involved in 
violence before the intervention, and this can be highly destabilizing. Elections can 
                                                
33 M. Newman, Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions (2009), at 140. 
34 A.J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (2009), at 176. 
35 Ibid., at 177. 
36 Newman, supra note 33, at 141. 
37 Bellamy, supra note 34 at 168. 
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encourage a ‘winner-take-all’ mentality that invites political intimidation and renewed 
conflict.38 In Bosnia, for example, US pressure for early elections allowed nationalist 
parties to consolidate power, entrenching the ethnic divisions that had fuelled the war in 
the first place.39 Replacing the state as a driver of development or provider of public 
goods deprives the state of an effective way to acquire legitimacy. It may leave the 
country with no institutional capacity to monitor and enforce complex economic 
transactions and may result in a situation in which privately supplied goods are 
unaffordable or under-supplied. Without stable political institutions and effective laws, 
property rights remain poorly defined while corruption and criminal activities flourish. 
In Kosovo, economic reforms aimed at liberalizing markets were undertaken despite a 
weak infrastructure and large income disparities between rural and urban areas, stoking 
resentment and renewed violence.40  
Such problems do not mean that efforts to bring about a change of regime 
cannot be justified. As Walzer emphasizes in his preface to the most recent edition of 
Just and Unjust Wars, when a government is engaged in murdering many of its own 
people, its murderousness makes it ‘a legitimate candidate for forcible transformation’. 
And the intervening power necessarily takes on ‘some degree of responsibility for the 
creation of an alternative government’.41 A new regime must be put in place and 
enforced until it can maintain itself without outside assistance. How this can be done 
effectively depends on the circumstances, but it is clear that the responsibility to protect 
includes a responsibility to replace or reform the government that so signally failed to 
perform its own responsibilities.  
There are, moreover, good reasons why the new regime should be a democratic 
one: democratic governments are legitimate because they are the most likely outcome of 
authentic self-determination, even if set up under a trusteeship, and they are less likely 
than non-democratic ones to abuse the moral rights of their citizens. There are many 
obstacles to establishing a democratic post-intervention regime, especially if there are 
indigenous anti-democratic traditions that have to be accommodated. In such cases, 
democratic changes might have to be delayed or democratic principles compromised. 
But, as Walzer sees it, self-determination cannot be entirely anti-democratic. This does 
                                                
38 Ibid., at 173. 
39 Newman, supra note 33, at 148. 
40 Ibid., at 158. 
41 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th edn), supra note 1, at pp.x, xi. 
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not necessarily undercut the view, which he defends in Just and Unjust Wars, that self-
determination is a right to self-government, not democratic government.42 Movements 
to resist a foreign oppressor may express the will of the people, but they are not 
necessarily driven by a desire for democracy. Nor are national liberation movements 
always democratic. Self-determination is ‘a political process that also has its value, even 
if it isn’t always pretty, and even if its outcome doesn’t conform to philosophical 
standards of political and social justice’.43 All regimes, no matter what their origin and 
politics, have to answer to the demands of human rights, however. An intervention to 
promote democracy cannot be justified as humanitarian, but an intervention to thwart 
mass murder cannot avoid calling for a new regime that respects human rights, and 
today these are increasingly seen as including democratic rights. If there are obstacles to 
establishing a decent and effective regime, efforts must be made to overcome them. But 
the existence of obstacles to such a regime is no reason to refrain from the effort to 
construct it.   
The argument that it might be necessary to establish a new regime to prevent 
violence from recurring implies that intervention might be justified to prevent its 
occurring in the first place. Instead of an argument that limits intervention to situations 
in which a massacre is already under way, we now have an argument for intervention to 
pre-empt an imminent massacre or prevent a possible one. This raises issues that in Just 
and Unjust Wars Walzer discusses in relation to international aggression. He argues 
there that a pre-emptive strike to deflect a probably fatal and credibly imminent attack 
might be justified, but not a war to prevent a long-term shift in the balance of power. 
We can also use that argument to distinguish pre-emptive from preventive humanitarian 
intervention. If states cannot wage preventive war to deal with long-term threats to 
security, neither can they do so to prevent possible but not imminent crimes against 
humanity. What they should do is work to strengthen laws protecting human rights in 
countries where such rights are abused by helping such countries to ameliorate ethnic or 
religious conflicts and by supporting arrangements to deal with human rights abuses 
before they reach a crisis level. But there may be times – Rwanda in 1994 might have 
been one of them – when genocidal violence is being plotted and reasonably appears to 
be imminent, and pre-emptive intervention to forestall the violence therefore justified. 
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There may also be times when it is right to use coercive measures, such as embargoes 
and no-fly zones, that do not rise to the level of war (even if international law calls them 
acts of war). The latter argument is not an argument for preventive war but for ‘the 
preventive use of force-short-of-war’ to control a possibly genocidal regime without 
overthrowing it. 
 
5 The Limits of Protection 
Prevention is just one of the issues that arise as soon as the debate on humanitarian 
intervention is reframed from a debate about the right of states to intervene to one about 
the duty of states to protect. Protection is an open-ended concept: one can draw a line 
between protecting people from violence and protecting them from other harms, but 
where to draw that line is often a political question. If the duty to intervene is a duty to 
suppress wrongful violence, we have a criterion that puts mass murder on one side of 
the line and natural disasters on the other. But if the ground for intervening is concern 
for the welfare of those suffering harm, the duty to protect would seem to cover a wider 
range of harms, such as famine.  
This extension of the occasions for justifiable armed intervention invites the 
response that there is no controversy over the duty to protect, only over the duty to 
protect by means of force. And where force is justified to resist violent harms it may not 
be justified to remedy harms resulting from natural causes. But, as Walzer and others 
observe, famine is both a ‘natural’ disaster and a political one: starvation is sometimes – 
some, like Amartya Sen, would say almost always – the result of deliberate policy or 
culpable negligence.44 Perhaps more often negligence, or just general indifference: 
though it is sometimes possible to identify those who are responsible, there is usually no 
straightforward liability. It is only in exceptional cases that some tyrant or warlord is 
wilfully causing the famine, which would justify a military intervention to end the 
wrongdoing and enforce respect for human rights.45 More often there are practices that 
have famine as one of their unintended and even unrecognized consequences (famines 
usually occur in remote rural areas and are, at least initially, often underreported, 
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especially in countries with poor communications or without a free press). There is no 
‘violence’ to be thwarted, but there are people to be rescued or a foreseeable disaster to 
be prevented, and therefore an obligation to address the predisposing conditions. It 
might be hard to determine which of those conditions were the result of violence and 
which the result of misfortune. The practices that sustain poverty and famine are often 
violent and oppressive, or the outcome of past violence and oppression. To the extent 
that this is so, the boundary zone between violent and non-violent harm is wide and not 
well marked. Practically speaking, it may be hard to separate cases of beneficence from 
cases of justice even if beneficence and justice are conceptually distinct.46 Protection, 
then, invites attention to the underlying conditions that lead to oppression and violence 
– land or water shortages, poverty, corruption, and other threats to a decent and secure 
life – conditions that are often, moreover, themselves the outcome of past violence and 
oppression.  
The principle of responsibility to protect has recently been invoked, not without 
controversy, in relation to the failure of the government of Myanmar to cooperate with 
countries seeking to provide assistance to deal with the consequences of the devastating 
cyclone that struck the country in 2008. Cyclone Nargis may have killed 150,000 people 
immediately and displaced ten times that number. That situation led French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner to invoke the principle of responsibility to protect to justify 
forcible action to deliver aid to the victims. His suggestion was quickly repudiated on 
the ground that the principle justifies international action only in relation to genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and that it could not apply in 
a natural disaster unless a government’s actions before or after the disaster fell into one 
of these categories. The suggestion might seem to go beyond current understandings of 
the responsibility to protect, as stated in United Nations documents like the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document47 and the Secretary General’s 2009 report,48 though the 
Gaddafi regime arguably committed war crimes with its shelling and use of cluster 
bombs in populated areas. Those documents affirm that each state has a responsibility to 
protect those it governs against the designated crimes, but that responsibility passes to 
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the international community if a state fails to do so, and that the Security Council may 
authorize forcible action if voluntary measures fail. Whether or not the facts support 
bringing the Libyan intervention within the scope of the rapidly-changing international 
law on responsibility to protect, the fact that the debate occurred at all makes clear that 
once one embraces the idea of a duty to protect, the limits of that duty will need to be 
specified, politically as well as philosophically.  
We must also consider the unexpected and sometimes unfortunate consequences 
of humanitarian action. As a growing literature documents, humanitarian policies can 
not only fail but can also make things worse.49 The growth of humanitarian assistance in 
the past 40 years has created opportunities for criminal exploitation that should not 
surprise anyone because wherever there are resources there will be opportunities for 
corruption and crime. It may or may not be true that the amputations in Sierra Leone 
were part of a strategy by rebel warlords to gain media attention and attract foreign 
aid.50 But famine relief can end up in the hands of well-fed officials or armies, and mass 
murderers who have been driven out of a country can continue to operate from refugee 
camps, as the Khmer Rouge did after they were expelled from Cambodia and Rwandan 
killers did from resettlement camps in the eastern Congo. And the soldiers who make 
humanitarian interventions possible are as capable of misconduct as any other soldiers. 
Anticipating and dealing with the ‘revenge effects’ of humanitarian action must be part 
of policy-making, but it does not raise novel ethical questions: clearly, both morality 
and prudence dictate that those who act must consider the consequences and costs of 
their decisions.  
Though circumstances are always changing, just war theory changes only 
slowly. The casuistry of the day can cause the theory to assume baroque or even rococo 
forms, but the underlying classic structure is seldom much affected. It consists today, as 
it has for centuries, of a jus ad bellum identifying the conditions for going to war, a jus 
in bello prescribing rules governing the conduct of military operations, and a jus post 
bellum prescribing proper conduct in restoring peace and justice after the fighting has 
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ended. Walzer suggests that we also need a jus ad vim – a theory of the conditions for 
using force short of war – but this, too, is already part of just war thinking, and of his 
own thinking, for people have long argued about the rights and wrongs of blockades, 
border raids, reprisals, assassinations, and other coercive acts that do not quite rise to 
the level of war. Philosophers have questioned and will continue to question these 
concepts and the principles they name, but being rooted in practice the concepts and 
principles are resistant to change. Walzer has contributed to our understanding of 
humanitarian intervention by providing a coherent account of it as a historic practice, 
showing its place in the structure of just war theory, and illuminating the moral and 
political issues it raises. He makes no excuse for avoiding philosophical perplexities and 
focusing on substantive moral and political questions. Bridging the domains of 
philosophy and politics, Walzer educates and provokes the inhabitants of each. 
 
 
